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PRIOR RESTRAINT OF MOTION PICTURES
BY ERNEST GIGLIO*
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Freedman v.
Maryland1 once again raises questions regarding the constitutionality of ad-
ministrative licensing systems exercising prior restraint over the content of
motion pictures. While the Freedman decision invalidated a state censorship
law2 on the ground that it failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards
with respect to final judicial determination, it reaffirmed the principle laid
down in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,3 upholding the validity of
statutes requiring the submission of motion pictures for approval, in advance
of exhibition. Thus, thirteen years after the Court's recognition in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson4 of the motion picture as a medium of expression
deserving protection under the Constitution, freedom to exhibit films is in-
hibited by administrative prior restraint. 5 It is this perpetuation of the con-
stitutionality of film censorship that requires reexamination.
The inherent assumption underlying the constitutionality of film censor-
ship is that prior restraint of the motion picture is compatible with th
guarantees of free speech and press enunciated in the first amendment.6 This
assumption is conditional upon the validity of three premises: (1) that it is
possible to draft a clearly drawn censorship statute whose standards satisfy
the constitutional test of definiteness; (2) that the administrative operation
of film licensing agencies meets the constitutional requirement of fairness
implicit in due process of law; (3) that the motion picture is more influential
and potentially more harmful in its effect upon human behavior patterns than
the press and the other media of communication, therefore justifying its
* B.A., 1953, Queens College; M.A., 1957, State University of New York at Albany;
Ph.D., 1964, Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University; Assistant Professor of
Political Science, Villanova University.
1. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
2. MD. ANN. CoPE art. 66A, §§ 2-23 (1957).
3. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
4. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5. New York, Virginia and Kansas have statutes similar to the Maryland statute
and the cities of Chicago, Detroit, Fort Wayne and Providence have similar ordinances.
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, p. 19, Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The situation in New York, however, is uncertain.
Recently that state's highest court held in Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents
of the Univ. of N.Y., 16 N.Y.2d 536 (1965), that the state's motion picture censorship
law was null and void on the ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment. Whether
the state will appeal the decision or attempt to enact new legislation to meet judicial
requirement remains to be seen.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
379
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classification in a special category outside the protection of the Constitution.
This article will test the validity of these premises, questioning whether ad-
ministrative prior restraint of motion pictures is constitutionally acceptable.
THE VALIDITY OF STATUTORY CENSORSHIP STANDARDS: DEFINITENESS
Since the Burstyn decision, the Court and state courts have consistently
invalidated statutory censorship standards when applied to particular motion
pictures. The Burstyn Court struck down "sacrilegious" as a valid censorship
standard on the ground that it was too vague to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. A unanimous Court recognized that to rely upon
an elusive standard like "sacrilegious" was to set the censor "adrift upon a
boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with
no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. ' 7
The Court ruled that the vagueness of the standard permitted arbitrary ad-
ministrative determinations, wherein state and local censors were most likely
to support the predominant religious sentiment rather than minority view-
points. Succeeding Court decisions invalidated the statutory censorship
standards of "harmful," "immoral," 9 and "obscene, indecent and immoral"'10
when applied to particular motion pictures in cases arising from administrative
licensing agencies. Meanwhile, state courts were rendering similar verdicts in
New York" and Maryland 12 censorship cases.
These decisions prompted several states with administrative licensing
agencies to amend their censorship laws so as to define more precisely their
statutory standards. In 1954 New York inserted a new section which stated
that the standards "immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals" would now apply
to any motion picture:
... the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic;
or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewd-
ness; or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable,
acceptable or proper patterns of behavior. 13
7. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 504-05.
8. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
9. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 346 U.S.
587 (1954).
10. Holmby Prod., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
11. Capital Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 1 App. Div.
2d 990, 149 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1956), wherein the court reversed the Regents' ruling that
the film, Mom and Dad, was "indecent." Broadway Angels, Inc. v. Wilson, 282 App. Div.
643, 125 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1953), where the court ruled that the film, Teenage Menace,
could not be denied a license on the ground that its exhibition would "tend to corrupt
morals" and "incite crime."
12. United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 210 Md. 586, 124 A.2d
292 (1956), where the court ruled that the film, The Man With the Golden Arm, did not
"tend to incite crime" within the meaning of the statutory standard.
13. N.Y. EDUc. LAW ch. 16, § 12 2a.
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The amended New York statute came up for consideration in Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 1 4 involving the film version
of D. H. Lawrence's novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover. The film had been
denied a license by the Board of Regents on the ground that it was "immoral"
in that it presented adultery as a desirable, proper, and acceptable pattern
of behavior, contrary to section 122a of the amended state censorship statute.
New York's highest court affirmed the Regents' determination, 15 but a
unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 122a
was unconstitutionally applied to the film involved.' 6 The Court challenged
the constitutional applicability of section 122a of the New York statute, be-
cause it denied a license to any motion picture which approvingly portrayed
adultery, regardless of the manner in which the relationship was presented.
The Court noted that the effect of the statute:
• . . is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that
picture advocates an idea-that adultery under certain circumstances
may be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic guarantee
is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus
struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty.
17
Moreover, the Regents contended that the film portrayal of an adulterous
relation was repugnant to the moral standards of the community and just
cause for denial of a license. In so contending they misconstrued the essence
of what the Constitution really protects:
Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of an
opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advo-
cacy of socialism or the single tax.' 8
It was obvious after Kingsley that the Court had severely narrowed the
valid statutory standards that it would uphold in denying exhibition licenses
to motion pictures. After the Court had placed "obscenity" outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment freedoms of speech and press in Roth v. United
States,19 and Alberts v. California,20 censors applied this standard in their
14. 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
15. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151
N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958).
16. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
17. Id. at 688.
18. Id. at 689.
19. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Here the constitutionality of the federal obscenity statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), which makes punishable the mailing of material that is "obscene,
lewd, lascivious or filthy . . . or . . . of an indecent character," was upheld and Roth's
conviction sustained.
20. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case, decided together with Roth, involved the
constitutionality of the California obscenity provisions, CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311
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determinations, failing, however, to realize that what they considered ob-
scene content in films might not adhere to the Court's definition. The Roth
Court, rejecting the legal definition of obscenity laid down in an English
case, 2 1 established as the legal test of obscenity "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
22
The disparity between the censors' and the Court's interpretation of the
definition of obscenity was illustrated in succeeding state23 and lower federal
court24 cases. In each instance the censorial determinations that the particular
films were obscene and therefore not entitled to exhibition licenses were
overruled. In one case the Court had an opportunity to examine the denial of
an exhibition license to a film on the ground of obscenity.25 The Court wrote
no opinion, merely reversing the censorial judgment on authority of Alberts.
Subsequently, in Jacobellis v. Ohio,26 the Court held that the state courts
had erred in the conviction of a Cleveland theater manager for exhibiting a
film in violation of the state obscenity law, since the film was not obscene
according to the Roth test. The Court admitted, however, that the application
of an obscenity law to suppress a film required "ascertainment of the 'dim
and uncertain line' that often separates obscenity from constitutionally pro-
tected expression. '2 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart proposed
that the Court restrict the definition of obscenity to "hard-core pornography,"
even though he frankly admitted:
(1955), which makes it a misdemeanor to keep for sale material that is "obscene or
indecent." The provision was upheld and Alberts convictions thereunder was sustained.
21. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360. Here the test of obscenity was based on
the effect of isolated passages upon particularly susceptible persons.
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489. The Court further defined prurient as
"material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 487. For a critical analysis
of the Roth test of obscenity see ERNST & SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE
OBSCENE (1964) ; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REv.
1 (1960) ; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960) ; Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The
Core Constitutional Issue, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961).
23. E.g., Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144
N.E.2d 31 (1957) (nudist colony film not "obscene" since it did not appeal to prurient
interest). See also Connection Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 17 App. Div. 2d 671,
230 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1962), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1105 (1962) (use of four letter word for
excretion was vulgar but not obscene within meaning of state statute).
24. E.g., Capital Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 260 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1958)
(contents of film, Mom and Dad, not obscene because it failed to appeal to prurient
interest). See also Columbia Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago, 184 F. Supp. 817 (N.D.
Ill. 1960) (Anatomy of a Murder film not obscene within meaning of Chicago censorship
ordinance) ; Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1960) (Garden of Eden film not obscene).
25. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
26. 378 U.S. 184 (1963), reversing, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
27. Id. at 187.
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I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that short hand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case
is not that.
2 8
Since Burstyn, the Court has struck down all statutory censorship
standards save "obscenity," and the vagaries of judicial interpretations of
that standard tend to confirm the view that any standard utilized by ad-
ministrative licensing agencies defines that preciseness of statutory construc-
tion necessary to satisfy the constitutional test of definiteness. To allow censors
to continue to apply "obscenity" or other newly contrived standards which lack
common consensus in their interpretation, encourages arbitrary administra-
tive determinations in a system of government historically rooted to the
rule of law, not men.
ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSING AGENCIES AND DUE PROCESS
Judicial decisions since Burstyn were concerned primarily with the
validity of statutory standards applied to particular films by administrative
licensing agencies. In the recent Freedman case, however, the issue confront-
ing the Court was that of an invalid prior restraint. Protected expression
was suppressed because the statute did not provide adequate procedural
safeguards to the exhibitor applying for an exhibition license.29 Fundamen-
tally, the censorship procedures in those states and municipalities which re-
quire advanced licensing of motion pictures are quite similar. The applicant
for a license is compelled by statute to submit his film to the censor in advance
of its exhibition. The censors usually exercise one of three alternatives:
approval, deletion or rejection. If the film is approved, it receives an ex-
hibition permit or license. If deletions are required as a condition of approval,
or if the film is rejected in toto, the applicant generally has both administra-
tive and judicial review.
30
It was the appeal procedure that the Court scrutinized in Freedman and
held to be constitutionally deficient. In invalidating the Maryland censorship
law,31 the Court noted that the Maryland statute permitted undue delay in
obtaining final judicial determination of board decisions, that no provision
28. Id. at 197.
29. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, §§ 17, 19 (1957).
30. In Kansas, Maryland and Virginia, administrative review of censorial determina-
tions is under the jurisdiction of the state censor boards. See KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. § 51-101
to §54-109 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 19 (1957) ; VA. ANN. CODE §§ 2 to
109 (1959). In New York, however, administrative review is under the jurisdiction of the
state Board of Regents. See N.Y. EDuc. LAW ch. 16, § 124.
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, §§ 2 to 23 (1957).
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was made for judicial participation in the censor board's decision, and that
exhibitors rather than the board bore the burden of origination and persua-
sion in judicial review. 32 Previously, the presumption of constitutionality
existed so long as the applicant whose film had been denied a license always
had final recourse to the courts. The Freedman Court, however, recognized
the inherent unfairness in the presumption, since the time-consuming factor
involved in court litigation is especially damaging to the motion picture
medium, which relies heavily upon current publicity to attract its audience.
A unanimous Court noted that the risk of delay was built into the Maryland
censorship procedure.3 3 In the only reported case3 4 the initial judicial deter-
mination had taken four months, while final vindication of the film on
appellate review had taken six months.3 5 Furthermore, the Court recognized
the necessity of the film exhibitor to be assured, either by statute or judicial
construction, that the censoring agency will, within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain the exhibition of the film.
3 6
Without these procedural safeguards, local exhibitors may find it too burden-
some to challenge censorial determinations. The Court noted that the film
distributor, too, might be unwilling to accept the costs and burdens of litiga-
tion in a particular state or city with administrative licensing systems when
he can freely exhibit the film in most of the country.
3
Two weeks later, the Court, in Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y.,3 8 reversed per curiam the judgment of the
state court of appeals on the authority of Freedman. The issue in the state
courts was whether the Board of Regents' order to delete two scenes deemed
"obscene" in the Danish film, A Stranger Knocks, should be upheld.3 9 The
significance of the Trans-Lux decision is that the Court did not rule on the
obscenity issue; rather it implicitly invalidated the administrative licensing
system in New York on procedural grounds.
SPECIAL CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION OF THE MOTION PICTURE
The Burstyn Court had upheld the constitutionality of administrative prior
restraint of the motion picture medium on the ground that each method of
expression is different and that no general rule can apply to establishment of
precise regulations for dealing with the specific problems of each. However,
32. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 55.
33. Id. at 56.
34. United Artists Corp. v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 210 Md. 586, 124 A.2d 292
(1956).
35. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 57.
36. Id. at 58-59.
37. Id. at 59.
38. 380 U.S. 259 (1965).
39. See Trans-Lux Distrib. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 14 N.Y.2d
88, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964), affirming, 19 App. Div. 2d 937, 244 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1963).
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the Court did place a "heavy burden" on the state to justify the exercise of
prior restraint as applied to the motion picture. 40 While the "heavy burden"
still existed in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,41 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an administrative film licensing law on the ground that
the motion picture medium, because its influence on human behavior was felt
to be greater and potentially more harmful than the impact of the other media
of communication, was excluded from the freedom accorded to the press in
Near v. Minnesota.42 The Freedman Court affirms the view that motion pic-
tures are not necessarily subject to the precise rules governing other methods
of expression. 43 It notes that with films as with other media, "any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity. '44 There is no suggestion in Freedman,
however, that the same requirements for overcoming the presumption apply,
and the Times Film distinction between media must be assumed to survive.
In Near, the Court had upheld the right of the state to punish subsequent
to the abuse of publication which violated statutory standards. The Times Film
majority limited its approval of prior restraint to the film medium, which had
the effect of classifying the motion picture in a special category outside the
constitutional protection accorded to the press. Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
in his Times Film dissent, took issue with the "special classification" concept
because it led the majority to endorse the principle that one medium of com-
munication can be subject to prior restraint while the others cannot. The
special classification concept was inconsistent with the Court's decision in
Near and was a judicial construction without substance. The Chief Justice
stated that "the Court in no way explains why moving pictures should be
treated differently than any other form of expression, why moving pictures
should be denied the protection against censorship. '45 The Court had failed
to present the necessary evidence to support its exclusionary rule for the
motion picture. Nor did the Court recognize the increasing public exposure
to television, an exposure of far greater consequence than that of the film
medium. But even if the motion picture were to exert a substantially greater
influence upon human behavior than the other media, the Chief Justice in-
sisted that "that fact constituted no basis for the argument that motion
pictures should be subject to greater suppression. ' 46
The Court's present view, expressed in Times Film, restates the third
40. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 503-04.
41. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
42. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
43. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 57.
44. Ibid. The Freedman Court quoted Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963).
45. Times Films Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. at 76.
46. Id. at 77.
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premise which supports the constitutionality of administrative prior restraint
of the film medium. The contention of the Times Film majority47 was that
since the motion picture was potentially more harmful in its effect upon
human behavior, the medium necessitated the drawing of a distinction be-
tween it and the other media of communication.4 8 Once the Court drew the
distinction and placed the medium in a special category, it followed logically
that it could constitutionally be subject to administrative prior restraint by
state and local censors for the maintenance of public morality. The Court,
however, failed to present collaborating evidence for its special classification
concept in Times Film.49 This viewpoint characterized the research conducted
in the 1930's by a group of sociologists, psychologists and educators who
studied the effect which the motion picture exerted upon the behavior pat-
terns and conduct of children. The studies, known as the Payne Fund studies,
were stimulated by public criticism of Hollywood films, especially the in-
creasing number of gangster and Mae West-type films. The results of the
studies,50 which encompass numerous investigations, showed that motion
pictures should be selected for children's viewing because a relationship
exists between films and the formation of behavior patterns and mental
attitudes. One particular study went further and suggested that the medium
was a contributing factor to delinquency and crime causation.51
Had the Court rendered its Times Film decision at the time of the Payne
Fund studies instead of thirty years later, the rationale for its belief that a
positive correlation exists between the content of motion pictures and subse-
quent anti-social behavior patterns would have had the benefit of evidence
resulting from contemporary social research. For three decades, however,
the Payne Fund studies have been subjected to vigorous criticism from the
behavioral and social sciences for conclusions drawn on the basis of faulty
methodology.52 Space does not permit a complete listing of the evidence
gathered to refute the Payne Fund studies, but even a partial examination
of contemporary social research contradicts the premise of a direct causal
relationship between the motion picture and anti-social behavior. 53 Five
47. The Times Films majority was comprised of Justices Clark, Stewart, Harlan,
Wittaker (now retired) and Frankfurter (deceased).
48. Times Films Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. at 49-50, 76.
49. Id. at 77 (dissent).
50. FORMAN, OUR MOVIE MADE CHILDREN (1933).
51. BLUMER & HAUSER, MOVIES, DELINQUENCY, AND CRIME (1933).
52. E.g., ADLER, ART AND PRUDENCE (1937). Adler criticized the methodology
employed by the researchers and the conclusions drawn from questionable methodological
techniques.
53. See generally ADLER, oP. cit. supra note 52. DEUTSCHER, THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: FROM SUICIDE TO DELINQUENCY (1963). Deutscher claims that de-
linquency is basically a social problem and will ultimately be solved only when there is an
intervention in the ongoing processes of the society, i.e., when there is an altering of
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Justices, however, in Times Film upheld the constitutionality of prior re-
straint, partially on the basis of a popularly held, but scientifically unsound
premise.
ADMINISTRATIVE PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Burstyn Court elevated the legal status of the film medium, and
brought motion pictures within the protection of the first amendment. The
Court recognized the development of the medium as an instrument of com-
munication, holding that motion pictures:
... are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They
may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, rang-
ing from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.54
While the Court recognized the significance of the medium in its Burstyn
decision, it went on to state the limitations of its ruling. The Court's holding
was not to be misconstrued to mean "that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and
places. ' 55 The Times Film majority reiterated this limitation.5 6 The Freed-
man Court, however, criticized reliance on Times Film by Maryland's high-
est court and stated that the only question tendered for decision in Times
Film was "whether a prior restraint was necessarily unconstitutional under
all circumstances, ". 7 and that the case should not be interpreted broadly as
the social institutions, such as the school and the neighborhood, within the delinquent area.
To reduce delinquency to a personal problem and to observe the individual as the unit of
study rather than the total society in which he lives is to fall into the trap of reductionism.
ROBINSON, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1960). "There is, however, no consensus among
the experts as to the effect on delinquency of any of the mass media of communication and
no well-documented scientific study in this admittedly important field has yet been
published." Id. at 160. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, 215-19 (5th ed. rev.
1955) ("existing evidence is inconclusive on the effect of movies on delinquent behavior").
Cressey, The Motion Picture Experience as Modified by Social Background and Per-
sonality, 3 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 516-25 (1938) where the author claims that the Payne
Fund studies emphasized the negative influence of the movies while the results of his own
research indicated that movies exert a "reflexive" influence, i.e., whatever attitudes and
general information children may gather from the motion picture depends somewhat
upon how effective the connection is with inadequate social background and individual
limitations in intellect. Pittman, Mass Media and Juvenile Delinquency, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY ch. 10, 230-47 (1958). Here the author contends that BLUMER & HAUSER, op. cit.
supra note 51, was exploratory in nature and therefore its findings were not meant to be
definitive and conclusive. Pittman further questions the validity of Blumer and Hauser
basing their statistics on information received from delinquent or criminal offenders to
the effect that the motion picture was an important factor in their criminal careers, since
it is dubious whether delinquents possess enough insight to assess the factors which created
the situation.
54. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501.
55. Id. at 502.
56. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. at 48.
57. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 53 (emphasis in original) quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 70.
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approving the concept without qualification. Mr. Justice Douglas, however,
in a brief concurring opinion, reiterated his position on film censorship:
"I do not believe any form of censorship--no matter how speedly or pro-
longed it may be-is permissible.", 8 In a single footnote to this opinion, he
expressed doubt that the system upheld in the Times Film case could survive
the procedural test in Freedman.59
From Burstyn to Freedman the Court has preferred to decide cases
involving administrative film licensing laws on the narrowest grounds pos-
sible, striking down vague statutory standards and recognizing procedural
limitations in administrative licensing systems. Nevertheless, the underlying
assumption that prior restraint of the motion picture does not violate first
amendment freedoms of speech and press remains. The Freedman Court did
not depart from this assumption, but merely announced an added criterion
for testing the validity of statutes requiring advance approval of motion
pictures.
On the other hand, state courts have ruled against the assumption,
holding administrative film licensing systems to be an infringement of the
liberty of speech and press provided for in the federal constitution and in
their respective state constitutions. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that
its state censorship act 60 was too "general in character and does not appear
to meet the implied test of a restrictive and clearly drawn statute."61 The
majority agreed that the Burstyn decision was sufficient authority to hold
that the statute contravenes the first and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution.62 Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the
state's Sunday censorship statute63 to be void, prima facie, as a prior restraint
on the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution.64 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in-
validated the state's motion picture censorship statute on the ground that
it offended the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 5 When
the state legislature drafted a new statute, 66 the state supreme court struck
it down as a violation of article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.67 The court was cognizant
58. Id. at 61-62.
59. Id. at 62.
60. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 3305.01 to 3305.09 (1964).
61. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Educ. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 263,
122 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
62. Id. at 265, 122 N.E.2d at 771.
63. MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 136, § 4 (Ter. ed. 1953).
64. Brattle Films v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 83, 127 N.E.2d 891
(1955).
65. Hallmark Prod., Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
66. Pa. Motion Picture Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70 (1959).
67. Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 897 (1961).
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of the Times Film ruling; however, it maintained that Times Film "in no way
involved the rights guaranteed the individual by the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion." 68 The court referred particularly to article I of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution which guarantees:
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the in-
valuable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write
and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of liberty.
6 9
In two censorship cases 70 involving local administrative film licensing
systems, state courts ruled the exercise of prior restraint to be repugnant to
their respective constitutions. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in City of
Portland v. Welch,71 invalidated the city's censorship statute on the ground
that censorship operating under an administrative licensing system constituted
prior restraint, rather than subsequent punishment, contrary to article I of
the state constitution. In K. Gordon Murray Prod. Inc. v. Floyd,72 the
Supreme Court of Georgia held the Atlanta motion picture censorship ordi-
nance to be repugnant to that section of article I of the Georgia constitution
which provides:
No law shall ever be passed to curtail, or restrain the liberty of
speech, or of the press; any person may speak, write and publish
his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty.
73
These decisions illustrate the basic disagreements between the Supreme
Court's position and that of specified state courts. The highest state courts
of Pennsylvania, Ohio and Massachusetts have held motion picture censor-
ship to offend the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution:
a viewpoint which a majority of the Court has yet to accept. Furthermore,
the Pennsylvania, Oregon and Georgia Supreme Courts have invalidated
film censorship on the ground that such exercise of prior restraint violates
the liberty guaranteed to speech and press in their respective state constitu-
tions. The anomaly of the Supreme Court's position is more clearly seen
when it is realized that the speech and press provisions of the above state
constitutions are similar in spirit, if not in language, to the guarantees ac-
corded free expression in the first amendment to the Constitution.
68. Id. at 95-96, 173 A.2d at 65.
69. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
70. City of Atlanta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 219 Ga. 271, 133 S.E.2d
12 (1963) ; Gordon Murray Prod. Inc. v. Floyd, 125 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. 1962). See City of
Portland v. Welch, 367 P.2d 403 (Ore. 1961).
71. 367 P.2d 403 (1961). The Oregon Constitution states: "No law shall be passed
restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print
freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right." OREGON CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).
73. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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CONCLUSION
In effect, the Freedman Court reaffirmed the right of the state to re-
quire the advanced submission of all films to an administrative licensing
system, but added the requirement that in administering the censorship pro-
cedure, the state has to insure that the finality of the censor's determination
lies in a judicial determination. 74 The implication in Freedman is that judges,
rather than censors, can impose a valid final restraint. Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined by Mr. Justice Black, nevertheless "would have put an end to all
forms and types of censorship and given full literal meaning to the command
of the First Amendment.
75
Despite the evidence that statutory censorship standards fail to meet the
constitutional test of definiteness, that they are procedurally defective, and
that the effect of film content as a source of anti-social behavior lacks verifica-
tion in contemporary social science research, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Freedman perpetuates motion picture censorship in our society.
Though the Court has limited the jurisdiction and operation of film censors,
it has failed to give legal status to the motion picture equal to that of the
other media. It is submitted that such status should be promptly recognized.
74. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 57-58.
75. Id. at 61. Two weeks after Freedman and concurrent with its ruling in the
Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. case the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in a
case which challenged the New York film licensing system, Gate Film Club v. Pesce, 236
F. Supp. 828, 339 F.2d 888 (1964), cert. denied, 85 S. Ct. 1023 (1965). Only Justice
Douglas was of the opinion certiorari should be granted.
